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It is one thing, though, to recognize and properly apply a
sound principle. It is quite another to run that same sound principle into the ground. It is one thing for a dog to have a tail. It is
quite another for the tail to wag the dog.*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The economic loss doctrine provides that "without some conduct
resulting in personal injury or property damage, there can be no
independent tort flowing from a contractual breach which would justify a tort claim solely for economic losses." 1 Initially, the doctrine
arose in product liability actions for the sale of goods, but courts subsequently expanded its application to service contracts.2 In Interstate
Securities Corp. v. Hayes Corp.,3 the Eleventh Circuit recently
expanded the economic loss doctrine further to bar claims for intentional torts and breach of fiduciary duty absent personal injury or
property damage.4 In taking this substantial step, the Eleventh Circuit neglected the implications of the doctrine in cases involving a
fiduciary relationship, focusing, instead, on the type of damages
* Deal v. Morrow, 197 F.2d 821, 826 (5th Cir. 1952), quoted in THE QUOTABLE
LAWYER § 9.59 (David S.Shrager & Elizabeth Frost eds., 1986).
1. AFM Corp. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 515 So. 2d 180, 181-82 (Fla. 1987).
2. Michael A. Hanzman, Interstate Securities Corporation v. Hayes Corporation: An
Unprecedentedand ImproperExpansion of Florida's"Economic Loss" and "Independent Tort"
Rules, FLA. B.J., Apr. 1992, at 42.
3. 920 F.2d 769 (11th Cir. 1991).
4. Id. at 773-77.
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sought by the litigants.' Interstate, read broadly, seems to eliminate
all tort actions for purely economic damages when the parties
involved have any contractual relationship, except in the rare case
when the injured party has no alternative means of recovery. This
decision unjustifiably expands the doctrine to bar clearly appropriate
tort claims.
The dispute in Interstatecentered around the decrease in value of
an investor's securities account by almost $4 million in just over seven
weeks.' The securities broker filed suit, alleging that the investor
owed the more than $1.8 million that the broker had paid on behalf of
the account. The investor counterclaimed, alleging that the broker's
breach of its fiduciary duty caused the account's diminution in value.'
Fiduciary relationships arise in many situations. A fiduciary
duty is defined as the "duty to act for someone else's benefit, while
subordinating one's personal interests to that of the other person." 9
The capacity of a "fiduciary" is said to include "such offices or relations as those of an attorney at law, a guardian, executor, or broker, a
director of a corporation, and a public officer." 10 The broad ambit of
the fiduciary concept leads to the conclusion that Interstate reaches
far beyond the facts of the case or its holding's intended scope, touching lawsuits against many types of professionals.1" In effect, Interstate
could potentially limit all professional liability disputes to contractual
causes of action.
This Note reveals the impropriety of extending the economic loss
doctrine to actions involving fiduciary relationships. Specifically, it
demonstrates the inappropriateness of applying Interstate to the fidu5. Id. at 776-77.
6. Id. at 771-72.
7. Id. at 772.
8. Although the client also brought breach of contract and negligence counterclaims, id.
at 771-72, this Note focuses on the claims for breach of fiduciary duty.
9. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 625 (6th ed., 1990).

10. Id
11. Although Interstate seemingly bars malpractice actions against other types of
professionals, this Note focuses on its impact on actions against legal practitioners. Other
commentators have recognized the potentially catastrophic consequences of the Interstate
decision:
Under the InterstateSecurities decision, taken to its logical extreme, customers of
professional services can no longer bring malpractice (i.e., negligence) claims or
breach of fiduciary duty claims against attorneys, accountants, appraisers, or
oth,.r professionals who render services to them pursuant to a contract no matter
how egregious the conduct. Rather, the client's sole remedy is an action for
breach of contract, and no exposure for punitive damages is present so long as
the litigants are parties to a contract and the conduct involved happens to
constitute a breach of the parties' agreement.
Hanzman, supra note 2, at 43-44.
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ciary setting of the attorney-client relationship in legal malpractice
actions. Part II recounts the development of the economic loss doctrine, discussing both its origin in product liability actions and its
extension to service contracts. Part III reviews the Interstate decision
by detailing the facts surrounding the dispute, outlining the Eleventh
Circuit's decision, and analyzing the problems with its holdings. Part
III further suggests that the economic loss doctrine should not insulate fiduciaries from tort liability. Part IV argues that application of
the economic loss doctrine in legal malpractice actions would clearly
contravene the policy underlying those actions-protection of the
entrusting party. Part V concludes that courts should create an
exception to the economic loss doctrine for actions involving parties
to a fiduciary relationship.
II.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECONOMIC Loss DOCTRINE

A. Origin of the Doctrine
A thorough understanding of the economic loss doctrine must
begin with the "two most prominent cases on economic loss:12
Santor v. A & M Karagheusian,Inc.,' 3 and Seely v. White Motor Co., 4
In Santor, carpet sold to the plaintiff developed unusual lines on its
surface. Santor sued the manufacturer, Karagheusian, for the carpet's cost.'" The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that Santor
could proceed against the manufacturer under breach of implied warranty of fitness theory for the difference between the price paid and
the actual value of the carpet, but it observed that an action based on
strict liability would provide a simpler ground for liability even
though the damage was limited to the product itself.'6 The court recognized that strict liability had "been applied principally in connection with personal injuries sustained by expected users from products
which are dangerous when defective," but felt "that the responsibility
of the maker should be no different where damage to the article sold
or to other property of the consumer is involved."' 7
In Seely, the plaintiff purchased a truck manufactured by White
from a third party for use in plaintiff's business of heavy-duty hauling.' 8 When driven, the truck "galloped," or bounced violently. For
12. Timothy L. Bertschy, Negligent Performance of Service Contracts and the Economic
Loss Doctrine, 17 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 249, 261 n.43 (1984).
13. 207 A.2d 305 (N.J. 1965).
14. 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965).
15. Santor, 207 A.2d at 306.
16. Id. at 311-13.
17. Id. at 312.
18. Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 147 (Cal. 1965).
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the nexi eleven months, the seller unsuccessfully attempted to correct
the problem.1 9 Finally, a brake failure caused the truck to overturn,
leaving the plaintiff uninjured, but the truck damaged. Seely sued the
seller arid White for the expense of repairing the truck, for the amount
paid toward the purchase price and for profits lost due to his inability
"to make normal use of the truck." 20 At trial, Seely dismissed the
case against the seller. The Supreme Court of California agreed with
the trial court that Seely was entitled to reimbursement of the
purchase price and damages for lost profits, but that, absent any evidence indicating that the galloping caused the accident, damages for
the repair of the truck were improper. 2' The court found White liable
for breach of an express warranty. On appeal, White argued that the
doctrine of strict liability had superseded warranty theory.2 2 The
court disagreed, explaining that "[t]he history of the doctrine of strict
liability in tort indicates that it was designed, not to undermine the
warranty provisions of the sales act or of the Uniform Commercial
Code but, rather, to govern the distinct problem of physical
23
injuries."
The Seely court examined and rejected the Santor approach
because "it would result in imposing liability without regard to what
representations of quality the manufacturer made."'24 The court
believed that Santor was rightly decided "only because the defendant
in that case marketed the rug as Grade # 1.''25 In a much-quoted
excerpt, Justice Traynor explained the rationale for the court's
decision:
The distinction that the law has drawn between tort recovery for
physical injuries and warranty recovery for economic loss is not
arbitrary and does not rest on the "luck" of one plaintiff in having
an accident causing physical injury. The distinction rests, rather,
on an understanding of the nature of the responsibility a manufacturer must undertake in distributing his products. He can appropriately be held liable for physical injuries caused by defects by
requiring his goods to match a standard of safety defined in terms
of conditions that create unreasonable risks of harm. He cannot be
heldl for the level of performance of his products in the consumer's
business unless he agrees that the product was designed to meet the
19. Id.
20. Id. at 147-48.
21. Id. at 148.
22. Id. at 149.

23. Id. The court also commented that "[p]hysical injury to property is so akin to
personal injury that there is no reason to distinguish them." Id. at 152.

24. Id. at 151.
25. Id.

1993]

ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE

1197

consumer's demands. A consumer should not be charged at the
will of the manufacturer with bearing the risk of physical injury
when he buys a product on the market. He can, however, be fairly
charged with the risk that the product will not match his economic
expectations unless the manufacturer agrees that it will. Even in
actions for negligence, a manufacturer's liability is limited to damages for physical injuries and there is no recovery for economic loss
alone.2 6
The majority of jurisdictions addressing this issue adopted the
Seely approach.2 7 The United States Supreme Court eventually
addressed this issue in East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica
Delaval, Inc.,28 a case arising under admiralty jurisdiction. The
Supreme Court reviewed the various approaches to cases involving
purely economic damages, including the majority (Seely) and the
minority (Santor)approaches. The Court found that "[t]he minority
view fails to account for the need to keep products liability and contract law in separate spheres and to maintain a realistic limitation on
26. Id.
27. East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 868 (1986). The
Supreme Court noted that the high courts of California and New Jersey seemed to be moving
"in the direction of the other since Santor and Seely." Id. at 869 n.4. (citing J'Aire Corp. v.
Gregory, 598 P.2d 60 (Cal. 1979) and Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 489
A.2d 672 (N.J. 1985)).
28. 476 U.S. 858 (1986). Transamerica had contracted to design, manufacture, and
supervise the installation of turbines that would serve as the main propulsion units for four

supertankers owned by East River. Id. at 859. Once put into service, each turbine
malfunctioned due to design and manufacturing defects, causing damages to the turbines.
Invoking admiralty jurisdiction, East River filed suit in the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey, alleging five counts of tortious conduct by Transamerica. Id. at 861.
The first four counts alleged that Transamerica was strictly liable for design defects in the high
pressure turbines of the four supertankers. Id. The fifth count charged Transamerica with
negligently supervising the installation of the astern guardian valve on one of the supertankers.
Id.
The Third Circuit affirmed en banc the district court's grant of summary judgment for
Transamerica. East River S.S. Corp. v. Delaval Turbine, Inc., 752 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1985).
The court held that if a defective product creates an unreasonable risk of harm to persons or
property other than the product itself, and harm arises, then damage solely to the defective
product is actionable in tort. Conversely, "[d]isappointments over the product's quality...
are protected by warranty law." Id. at 908.
The Supreme Court agreed with the Third Circuit that "whether principles of strict
products liability are part of maritime law 'is
no longer seriously contested,' " 476 U.S. at 865
(quoting Ocean Barge Transport Co. v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 726 F.2d 121, 123 (3d
Cir. 1984)) but then proceeded to discuss the inappropriateness of tort claims in this situation.
The court distinguished "the traditional 'property damage' cases," in which the defective
product damaged other property, from the present case in which only the purchased product,
the turbines, suffered damage. Id. at 867. The Court stated that "[o]bviously, damage to a
product itself has certain attributes of a products-liability claim. But the injury suffered-the
failure of the product to function properly-is the essence of a warranty action, through which
a contracting party can seek to recoup the benefit of its bargain." Id. at 867-68.
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damages." 29 It thus adopted the Seely view, holding "that a manufacturer in a commercial relationship has no duty under either a negligence or strict products-liability theory to prevent a product from
' 30
injuring itself."
B. Adoption and Expansion in Florida and the Eleventh Circuit
One year after East River, the Florida Supreme Court expounded
its position on purely economic damages in FloridaPower & Light Co.
v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.3' The parties had contracted for Westinghouse to design, manufacture, and furnish two nuclear steam supply systems, including six steam generators.32 Florida Power & Light
alleged that all six generators leaked and sued Westinghouse under
breach of express warranty and negligence theories, "seeking damages
for the cost of repair, revision, and inspection of the steam generators." 3 The federal district court granted Westinghouse's motion for
partial summary judgment on the negligence claim "on the grounds
that Florida law precludes the recovery of economic loss without any
'34
claim of personal injury or property damage to other property.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit certified two questions to the
Florida Supreme Court:
(1) Whether Florida law permits a buyer under a contract for
goods to recover economic losses in tort without a claim for
personal injury or property damage to property other than the
allegedly defective goods.

(2) If Florida law precludes recovery for economic loss in tort
without a claim for personal injury or property damage to
other property, whether this rule should be applied retroactively in this case. 5
Following the majority approach, the Florida Supreme Court
answered the first question in the negative. Turning to the second
question, the court found that, because its approach was consistent
with established Florida law, this rule would be applicable to all pending caseS. 36

In answering the first question, the Florida Supreme Court
accepted Seely's reasoning that contract principles are more appropri29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 870.
Id. at 871.
510 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1987).
Id, at 900.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 899-900.
Id. at 900.
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ate than tort principles for resolving actions concerning economic loss
without accompanying physical injury or property damage. 3 The
court explained the policy behind the economic loss doctrine as
"encourag[ing] parties to negotiate economic risks through warranty
provisions and price."' 38 The minority approach, on the other hand,
"exposes a manufacturer to liability for negligence based on economic
loss alone, replacing the freedom of bargaining and negotiation with a
duty of care."' 39 The court pointed to East River's emphasis that:
[a] duty of care.., is particularly unsuited to the vagaries of individual purchasers' product expectations. As important, under the
minority view, a manufacturer faced with this kind of liability
exposure must raise prices on every contract to cover the enhanced
risk. Clearly, product value and quality is covered by express and
implied warranties, and warranty law should control a claim for
purely economic losses."
Three months after rendering the Westinghouse opinion, the
Florida Supreme Court expanded the economic loss doctrine in AFM
Corp. v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.,41 another case
before the court on a question certified from the Eleventh Circuit, to
limit liability for negligently-rendered services.
AFM had contracted with Southern Bell to advertise in Southern
Bell's Yellow Pages.42 When AFM moved its office, Southern Bell
assigned it a new telephone number.43 The parties agreed that Southern Bell would provide a referral service to assist AFM's prospective
customers." Southern Bell distributed the Yellow Pages with AFM's
old, incorrect number listed rather than its new number.45 Southern
Bell exacerbated this mistake by assigning AFM's old number to a
different customer, which resulted in the automatic disconnection of
the referral system.4 6 Although Southern Bell reconnected the referral system once AFM discovered the mistakes, Southern Bell subsequently disconnected it again.47
AFM filed suit in Florida state court alleging negligence and
37. Id. at 902.
38. Id. at 901.

39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 515 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1987). For an examination of the "shortcomings" of AFM and its
progeny, see Matthew S. Steffey, Florida'sEconomic Loss Rule: A Critical Look at the Cases,
FLA. B.J., May 1990, at 19, 21-23.
42. AFM Corp. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 796 F.2d 1467, 1468 (11th Cir. 1986).
43. Id.

44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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breach of contract, and Southern Bell removed the case to the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. 48 At the
close of the evidence, AFM's counsel decided to proceed solely in
tort.49 The jury returned a verdict in favor of AFM for both compensatory and punitive damages.
Southern Bell appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
arguing that "the jury's award of compensatory damages [had to] be
overturned because AFM waived its contract cause of action and
therefore could not recover lost profits solely on its tort claim," 50 and
that AFMW failed to establish a tort independent of the breach of contract and, therefore, was not entitled to punitive damages.51 Finding
no Florida Supreme Court cases addressing these issues, the Eleventh
Circuit certified three questions to the Florida Supreme Court. The
Florida Supreme Court combined the three questions into one: "Does
Florida permit a purchaser of services to recover economic losses in
tort without a claim for personal injury or property damage?" 52 The
court answered the question in the negative, finding this answer
"[c]onsistent with [its] decision in ...

Westinghouse."53

In the court's view, AFM's attempt to recover economic losses
for a negligent breach of contract under tort theory was incongruous
with the fact that the parties had entered a contract "defin[ing] the
limitation of liability through bargaining, risk acceptance, and compensation. '5 4 AFM's failure to prove the commission of a tort
independent of the breach of contract removed any basis for the negli55
gence claim.

IIT.

INTERSTATE SECURITIES CORP. v. HA YES CORP.

Following the Westinghouse and AFM decisions, Interstate
Securities Corp. v. Hayes Corp.56 presented what appeared to be a case
ripe for application of the economic loss doctrine-a tort claim for
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1469.
52. AFM Corp. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 515 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1987).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 181.
55. Id. The court referred to Lewis v. Guthartz, 428 So. 2d 222, 223 (Fla. 1982), in which
it affirmatively answered the following certified question: "Where the defendant flagrantly,
unjustifiably, and oppressively breaches a contract, and attempts to conceal the breach by the
criminal act of making false statements to the government, must the plaintiffs plead and prove
that the det'endant committed an independent tort against them in order to recover punitive
damages?" The court held it imperative that a tort be "distinguishable from or independent of
[the] breach of contract." Id. at 224.
56. 920 F.2d 769 (11th Cir. 1991).
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economic damages brought by one party to a contract against the

other. Closer examination reveals, however, that the case should not
fall within the doctrine's reach.
A.

Facts of the Case

Hayes Corporation ("Hayes") and Interstate Securities Corporation ("Interstate"), a securities brokerage firm, entered into several
contracts allowing Hayes to trade options, commodities, and commodities options through an account at Interstate." The parties further agreed that Hayes could trade securities and write options on the
margin,5 provided that Roger Haendiges, the president and sole
shareholder of Hayes, assumed personal responsibility for any debts
incurred by the account.
The following month, Haendiges began writing uncovered
options59 through the account on behalf of Hayes." In March of
1986, Haendiges opened a personal securities trading account at a second brokerage firm, in which he also began writing uncovered call
options. 6' On May 19, 1986, Haendiges wrote 1100 uncovered call
options for Reebok International stock on the Hayes account and
1000 uncovered call options on his own account.6 2 When he
attempted to write 1000 additional put options on his personal
account, the second brokerage firm demanded that he increase the
57. Id. at 770.
58. Id. Trading "on the margin" indicates "that an investor only pays a portion of the
price of a security and borrows the remainder from his broker." Id. at 770 n.I. Securities
purchased "on the margin" are called "margin securities," BARRON'S DICTIONARY OF
FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 220 (2d ed., 1987) [hereinafter BARRON'S DICTIONARY],

and are held by securities brokers in "margin accounts." Id. at 223. Federal regulations limit
the amount of and conditions under which purchasing and trading of such investments can
occur.
59. Options are contracts through which one purchases from another the right to either
buy (call options) or sell (put options) stock at a certain price, the "exercise price," at or within
a certain time period. BARRON'S DICTIONARY, supra note 58, at 272-73. The amount paid by
an option buyer for the right to call or put the underlying security is the "option premium."
Id. at 274. If the option buyer does not exercise her right within the specified period, the
option expires and the option buyer forfeits the premium. Id. at 272. A person or financial
institution that sells options, hoping to receive the premium without the option being
exercised, is known as an "option writer." Id. at 274. If the call option writer owns shares in
the underlying security, the option is considered "covered." Id. at 82. An uncovered, or
"naked" option is written when one sells a call option for stock which the writer does not own.
Id. at 244-45, 450. An investor typically exercises a call option only if the stock's price
exceeds the exercise price. Id. at 272. Thus, if the option is exercised, the writer of an
uncovered option must purchase the stock and immediately sell it to the optionholder at the
lower exercise price.
60. Interstate, 920 F.2d at 771.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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equity in the account by $500,000 as a precondition to writing these
options.5 3 Instead, at Haendiges' request, Interstate combined the
personali account with the Hayes account, and, on May 23, Interstate
accepted the account "on the condition that Haendiges reduce his
exposure and execute additional promissory notes pledging his personal property to cover any shortfall."
One. week later, with the combined account's value between $1.8
million and $2 million, Interstate warned Haendiges that, if he failed

to meet any margin call within twenty-four hours, Interstate would
liquidate his account.65 On the next trading day, June 2, 1986,
Reebok's stock price rose substantially, depleting the equity in the
account 66 Interstate then issued Hayes a $217,552 margin call,67 and
continued to issue margin calls on the account for the next fifty-one
days.68 Although the average call amounted to $2 million, Haendiges
placed only $5,000, as a good faith deposit, in the account.69 On July

18, 1986, Interstate liquidated the Hayes account, which then had a
debit balance exceeding $1.8 million 70 During this period, Interstate
opened more than forty-five new option positions 7 1 in the account
despite -the account's negative liquidation value. 72 Between June 1
and the date of liquidation of the account, Interstate charged the

account with $318,415 in commissions-nearly sixty percent more
63. Id. This investment strategy, known as "combination writing," involves selling both
put and ca]l options for the same stock. BARRON'S DICTIONARY, supra note 58, at 67.
64. Interstate, 920 F.2d at 771.
65. Id. "Margin call means a demand by a creditor to a customer for a deposit of
additional cash or securities to eliminate or reduce a margin deficiency as required under this
part." 12 C.F.R. § 220.2(n) (1992). A "[m]argin deficiency means the amount by which the
required margin exceeds the equity in the margin account." 12 C.F.R. § 220.2(o) (1992).
66. Interstate, 920 F.2d at 771; see supra note 59 (explaining how writing uncovered
options could force the investor to pay an additional amount immediately and unexpectedly).
67. Interstate, 920 F.2d at 772.
68. Initial Brief of Appellants, Defendants/Counter Plaintiffs Below at 11, Interstate, 920
F.2d 769 (Nos. 89-3620 and 89-3729).
69. Id. at 3-4.
70. Interstate, 920 F.2d at 772.
71. A position is simply an investor's stake in a particular security. BARRON'S
DICTIONARY, supra note 58, at 296.
72. Initial
Brief of Appellants, supra note 68, at 11. During most of this time the account
had a negative value. One new position, opened when the account had a negative liquidation
value of $892,430, cost in excess of $300,000. Id.
Controversy arose as to who caused these new positions to be taken. Hayes and
Haendiges argued that on the day Regulation T allegedly required liquidation, see infra note
78, Interstate seized control of the account and began a new investment strategy using the
account's funds. Id. at 12. They further argued that this assumption of control and "failure"
to promptly liquidate the account caused the account's losses. Interstate argued that it simply
acquiesced in its customer's requests to keep the account open. Id. at 11-13.
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than the amount charged during the 150 days prior to June 1.73
Notwithstanding Interstate's claim that Haendiges "repeatedly urged
Interstate not to liquidate the Hayes account,"74 Haendiges maintained that Interstate "improperly assumed control of his account as
of June 2, 1986, and that he fully expected Interstate to liquidate the
'T
account at that time." 7

Interstate filed suit against Hayes Corporation the following
month to recover the debit balance of the account at time of liquidation and against Haendiges as guarantor of the account.76 Interstate
claimed that Hayes and Haendiges had caused Interstate to accept the
transferred account and allow it to remain open after the margin calls
by making fraudulent misrepresentations. 7 Hayes and Haendiges
counterclaimed against Interstate, alleging breach of fiduciary duty,
negligent handling of accounts, and violation of Federal Regulation

T. Regulation T regulates extensions of credit by brokers, imposing
obligations regarding the amount of equity that must be maintained in

an account.78
After the presentation of evidence, the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Florida ruled that AFM Corp. v.
Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co. 79 controlled, and that, "as

a matter of law, Hayes Corporation's and Haendiges's counterclaim
of negligence could not go forward." 80 Because the district court had
earlier ruled that evidence of Regulation T violations was irrelevant

and inadmissible, only the counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty
73. Id. at 12. During the 150 days preceding June 1, 1986, Interstate's commissions
totalled only $200,000. Id.
74. Interstate, 920 F.2d at 772 (quoting Appellee's Brief at 8).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. Regulation T governs issuance of credit by securities firms to investors trading on
the margin. It requires that the equity in an account be at a safe level before new positions are
opened in the account. Among its provisions, the regulation mandates that margin calls "shall
be satisfied within 7 business days after the margin deficiency was created or increased," 12
CFR § 220.4(c)(3) (1992), and that if a margin call to eliminate a deficiency is not met in full,
the broker "shall liquidate securities sufficient to meet the margin call or to eliminate any
deficiency existing on the day such liquidation is required, whichever is less." Id. at
§ 220.4(d). Legislative reports on the regulation indicate the purpose of the margin regulations
is the protection of investors by making it impossible to purchase securities on too thin a

margin.

STOCK EXCHANGE PRACTICES REPORT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND

CURRENCY, S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934), reprinted in WALL STREET AND
THE SECURITIES MARKETS 11 (Vincent P. Caneso & Robert Sobel eds., 1975).
Although Hayes and Haendiges initially pursued a breach of contract counterclaim, the
record is unclear as to its disposition other than that it was not pursued at trial. Interstate, 920
F.2d 772.
79. 515 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1987).
80. Interstate, 920 F.2d at 772.
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reached the jury.' The jury returned a verdict in favor of Interstate
for the full debit balance of the liquidated account and rejected the
counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty. 2 The district court augmented the award with interest and attorneys' fees, increasing the
total amount to $2,883,886.95.3
B.

The Eleventh Circuit Decision

The Eleventh Circuit framed the two primary issues on appeal as
follows:
First, whether the district court properly applied the holding in
AFM... to determine, as a matter of law, that Hayes Corporation
and Haendiges cannot sue Interstate for negligence. Second,
whether the district court erred in ruling that evidence of violations of regulation T is irrelevant and inadmissible and in failing to
instract the jury regarding regulation T in response to jury questions during deliberations. 4
The court affirmed the district court's holding that AFM barred the
negligence claims, and further held that AFM barred claims for
breach of fiduciary duty. 5 Based on the latter holding, the Eleventh
6
8
Circuit declared the Regulation T issues moot.
Hayes and Haendiges conceded that they could not recover dam-

ages in tort unless they met an exception to the AFM decision.8 7 They
argued that they met an exception because they were seeking recovery

for injury to "property" rather than solely economic losses and
because Interstate's behavior constituted a tort
independent from any alleged breach of contract. 8

separate and

81. Id. During deliberations, the jury submitted the following questions to the court: "If
it is a federal regulation that an account must be closed immediately, why was the account left

open until 23 July, 1986 with marginal [sic] calls coming in almost daily? End of question.
And, does :his affect the fiduciary relationship?" Id. at 772-73. Although counsel for Hayes
and Haend:iges suggested the jury was referring to Regulation T, see supra note 78, the court
agreed with. counsel for Interstate that no regulation required the immediate liquidation of an
account. Interstate, 920 F.2d at 773. The court responded to the inquiry: "There was no
federal regulation requiring the account to be closed immediately. As to why the account was
left open so long with marginal (adopting the jury's language) calls coming almost daily, that is
something which you, the jury, must determine from the evidence before you." Id. On appeal,
Hayes and Haendiges argued that these questions indicated that the jury had determined that
Interstate breached its fiduciary duties but that the court's response misled the jury into
changing its decision. Initial Brief of Appellants, supra note 68, at 37.
82. Interstate, 920 F.2d at 773.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 774.
88. Id.
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The first argument focused on the contention that the lost value
of the account constituted injured property. Attempting to distinguish AFM on the ground that AFM sought lost profits, Hayes and
Haendiges argued that they were "merely seeking the actual value of
their trading account on the day that Interstate allegedly had a duty
to liquidate it." 89
The Eleventh Circuit found this argument "fundamentally
flawed because it ignores the policies underlying the AFM decision. ' 9°
The court explained that, although AFM would allow recovery in tort
for "conduct resulting in . . . property damage," prior cases under
Florida law 9' required that the injured property be outside the scope
of the parties' contract. 92 Here, the account "was the primary subject
of the contract" between the parties, and thus could not constitute
"property" within the meaning of AFM.93 The court reasoned that,
because the agreements entered into governed the parties' relationship
regarding account management and risk allocation, damage to the
account was not damage to property outside of the contract's scope,
and no tort recovery was allowed. 94
Under their second argument, Hayes and Haendiges asserted
that Interstate's failure to manage the account non-negligently constituted an independent tort.9 5 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision not to submit this negligence claim to the jury
because "the remedies ... were negotiated or at least agreed upon by
the parties in the various customer agreements." 96 The court believed
it clear that AFM foreclosed negligent breach of contract claims and
that permitting tort recovery in this case would "disturb the agreement signed by the parties, blur the distinction between contract and
tort, and conflict fundamentally with the AFM decision. ' 97
In addition, Hayes and Haendiges claimed that Interstate
breached its fiduciary duty as a securities broker under Florida law 9 8
89. Id. at 775.
90. Id.
91. See Strickland-Collins Constr. v. Barnett Bank of Naples, 545 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1989); Belle Plaza Condominium Assoc. v. B.C.E. Dev., Inc., 543 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1989); GAF Corp. v. Zack Co., 445 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).
92. Interstate, 920 F.2d at 775.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 775-76.
98. Id. at 776; see Initial Brief of Appellants, supra note 68, at 41 (directing the court to
Henderson v. Usher, 170 So. 846, 852 (Fla. 1936) and Hayden, Stone Inc. v. Brown, 218 So. 2d
230, 235 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969) for the proposition that a broker in Florida always owes a
fiduciary duty to his customer).
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"by failing to liquidate the account promptly, by taking control of the
account prematurely, and by opening new positions in the account
that resulted in additional losses." 99 They argued that because common law, not the contract, provided the source of claims for breach of
fiduciary duty and utmost good faith, those claims constituted torts
separate and independent from the breach of contract. 00
Acknowledging that no Florida state court had applied AFM to
claims for breach of fiduciary duty, the Interstate court did locate, and
seemingly ignore, one Florida district court decision that dismissed a
claim for negligence but remanded a claim for breach of fiduciary
duty under AFM.I0 The court explained that Hayes' and Haendiges'
counsel stated at oral argument that a bar to the negligence claim
would also bar the claim for the breach of fiduciary duty. 10 2
The court relied on J. Batten Corp. v. Oakridge Inv. 85, Ltd.,103
which dismissed a fraud claim under AFM, for the proposition that
AFM barred claims for breach of fiduciary duty.10 The court reasoned that, "[i]f Florida courts dismiss fraud claims between parties
to a contract under AFM, it is probable that the Florida courts would
also dismiss fiduciary duty claims."' 1 5 The court emphasized two
points. First, claims for breach of fiduciary duty are based upon a
duty arising only when a contractual relationship has been established.10 6 Second, a plaintiff may establish breach of fiduciary duty by
showing the defendant's failure to take necessary action.' 0 7 The
plaintiff is not required to show any affirmative action by the
defendant.'
The court distinguished fraud claims from those based on breach
of fiduciary duty, stating that the former are "based upon a general
duty of good faith and fair dealing that pervades all commercial dealings, regardless of the existence of a contract" and that one bringing a
fraud claim must prove that the defendant engaged in affirmatively
fraudulerLt conduct. 0 9 The court believed that these differences made
fraud claims more likely to constitute separate and independent torts
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Interstate, 920 F.2d at 776.
Id.
Id. (citing Bankest Imports, Inc. v. ISCA Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1537 (S.D. Fla. 1989)).
Id.
546 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989).
Interstate, 920 F.2d at 776.
Id.
Id. at 777.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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under Florida law.10 Thus, because AFM foreclosed fraud claims,
the court held that it further barred claims for breach of fiduciary
duty, and, therefore, the district court erred in submitting the claim to
the jury."'

The court distinguished those Florida cases allowing tort recovery for economic damages by explaining that the plaintiffs in those
cases had no alternative means of recovery." 2 Conversely, in Interstate, the parties had recourse under contract theory, but Hayes and
Haendiges "apparently abandoned the breach of contract claim." 1 3
Thus, the court found that Florida courts would permit tort recovery
for purely economic loss only when alternative means of recovery are
4
unavailable. "1
C. A Pothole in the Interstate
The major problem in the Interstatedecision is the court's failure
to perceive the fundamental difference between the facts in Interstate
and in the other cases in the line of development of the economic loss
doctrine. The court ignored the special implications of the fiduciary
relationship the parties held despite its previous holding that brokers
specifically owe their clients fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. 1 5
The court did not rely on any case involving a fiduciary relationship.
Rather, the court simply assumed that the rules governing armslength contractual transactions and, consequently, the economic loss
doctrine applied to the fiduciary setting." 6
As courts have recognized for at least three-quarters of a century, I 7 fiduciary relationships should not be treated identically to
arms-length contractual relationships.' 1 8 In classic contractual relationships, the parties are in conflict, each one attempting to "protect
himself from the other's self-interested behavior."'' 9 Neither party
'

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

115. Gochnauer v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 810 F.2d 1042, 1049-50 (11th Cir. 1987).
116. See supra text accompanying note 105.
117. Benjamin Cardozo, while Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, opined that
"[m]any forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's length,
are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties." Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y.
1928).
118. See generally Tamar Frankel, FiduciaryLaw, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795 (1983) (comparing
fiduciary relationships with contract and status relationships, advocating recognition of
fiduciaries as a group and their governance under a distinct body of legal policies, principles,

and rules).
119. Id. at 799.
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has an Obligation to protect the other or to expect protection. 2 ° Conversely, "fiduciary relations are designed not to satisfy both parties'
needs, but only those of the entrustor."'' 21 In this role, the fiduciary
acts on behalf of and as a substitute for the entrusting party. The
fiduciary's needs are subordinated to those of the entrustor.
In Bankest Imports, Inc. v. ISCA Corp.,122 the case so quickly
dismissed by the Interstate court, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida recognized these distinctions between
arms-length transactions and transactions involving fiduciary relationships. 23 The Bankest Imports court emphasized the distinction
that "[iln an arms-length transaction ... there is no duty to act for
the benefit or protection of the other party." 1 24 A fiduciary relationship, on the other hand, includes "some degree of dependency on one
side and some degree of undertaking on the other side to advise, coun1 25
sel, and protect the weaker party."
Ignoring this distinction, the Eleventh Circuit, in Interstate,
relied instead on J. Batten,1 26 which affirmed the dismissal of a fraud
claim by a general contractor against a property owner with whom
the contractor had contracted.1 27 From this proposition the Eleventh
Circuit leapt to the rule that a client could not sue its securities broker
in tort for breach of fiduciary duty despite the fact that, in contrast to
the facts in Interstate, no fiduciary relationship existed in J. Batten.
The J. Batten court relied on AFM to justify its decision to bar
the fraud claim.' 28 AFM, like J. Batten, involved neither a fiduciary
relationship nor an independent duty. However, in cases involving
fiduciaries, such as securities brokers or attorneys, the law imposes
independent duties on the professional to the client because of the
professional's position of trust and dependence regardless of the specific language of any contract between the parties. In sum, the contracts in J. Batten and AFM provided the only possible source of any
duty. This is not the case with brokers, attorneys or other fiduciaries.
Much of the rationale for the economic loss doctrine in the settings of product liability and general service contracts vanishes in the
presence of a fiduciary relationship. The attorney-client relationship
120. Id. at 800.
121. Id. at 801. Frankel coined the term "entrustor" because no general term presently
exists to describe the "other" party in all fiduciary relationships.
122. 717 F. Supp. 1537 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
123. Id. at 1541.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. J. flatten Corp. v. Oakridge Inv. 85, Ltd., 546 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989).
127. Id. at 69.
128. Id.
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exemplifies the distinction between fiduciary situations and traditional
contractual relationships, in that the attorney does not warrant or
promise results, and the parties do not bargain for services even
though the client agrees to pay fees. 129 The inherent, underlying
agency relationship transforms any element of the bargained-for commercial expectations of the parties. 130 In light of this, applying the
economic loss doctrine to mandate contractual solutions to disputes
between fiduciaries and clients, as opposed to commercial situations
or arms-length transactions, is inherently unjust. The client must surrender much-a tort cause of action-in return for very little-a possible decrease in the professional's fee. The economic loss doctrine
was not designed to protect parties from tort liability simply because
the parties had entered a contractual relationship.
Two further examples illustrate this point. First, parties to a
joint venture typically draw up detailed contracts to govern their relationship. Often, one party holds the funds for the venture as a fiduciary.13 1 Interstate permits such a fiduciary to misapply the funds and,
if caught, rely on the economic loss doctrine to avoid tort liability and
corresponding punitive damages. 132 Second, stockbrokers can contractually agree to manage a client's portfolio. If such a stockbroker
misrepresents certain investments, "churns" the investor's account to
generate excessive commissions, or engages in acts of self-dealing, the
1 33
stockbroker should face liability in contract, tort, or both.
Allowing the economic loss doctrine to bar tort actions in these situations encourages wrongful conduct because the wrongdoer faces only
1 34
a minimal risk-the possibility of paying compensatory damages.
This application of the doctrine wrongly extends its protection to
classes of individuals never intended to reap its benefits.1 35
Judicial supervision of parties to a contract and parties in a fiduciary relationship also differs markedly in two respects. First, "a salient feature of fiduciary law is that it regulates only one of the
129. Blanche M. Manning, Legal Malpractice: Is it Tort or Contract?,21 Loy. U. CHI. L.J.
741, 754 (1990). Contingency fee arrangements, on the other hand, are, in a sense, an
agreement that the client need not compensate the attorney unless a certain result actually is
achieved.
130. Id. at 750.
131. See Hanzman, supra note 2, at 44.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 45.
134. Id. The wrongdoer may also be subject to liability under federal and state securities
statutes. However, fraud and breach of fiduciary duty claims have often been critical because
of the short limitations periods imposed by the statutes. Id. at 45 n.7.
135. Id. at 44.
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parties--the fiduciary," 136 whereas contract law regulates both parties. Second, courts rarely interfere with a contract freely made by
the parties unless it is unconscionable.' 37 In fiduciary relationships,
however, courts will intervene and require the fiduciary to act "with
loyalty and skill, in the entrustor's best interests."' 38 Furthermore,
courts have at times intervened to "assert the power to interpret the
delegated powers of fiduciaries and the purpose of the delegation."' 39
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Interstate implies that solely
the terms of the parties' contract should govern any fiduciary relationship between them. Assuming its correctness, the Eleventh Circuit's
decision dispenses with the need for a concept of "fiduciary duty."
Complete contractual control of a fiduciary's power and actions, however, is not a viable alternative to employing independent standards of
care and accountability specifically designed to deal with the broad
discretionary powers of fiduciaries. Even if a contract could provide
for all discretionary uses of power within the relationship and specify
the fiduciary's required course of action under all possible scenarios,
the transaction costs associated with making such a contract would be
enormous and probably outweigh the benefits of the relationship."4°
Conversely, attempting to avoid the transaction costs by drawing up a
less detailed document would leave the entrustor more susceptible to
abuses of the given power.

4

1

One could argue that the less detailed, transaction-cost-saving
document could be combined with direct control or supervision of the
fiduciary to prevent the abuses of power. Direct control, however,
reduces efficiency and might undermine the purpose of the fiduciary
relationship.' 42 For example, clients often employ fiduciaries, such as
securities brokers and attorneys, for their expertise. Direct client control may reduce the value of such expertise.' 43 Furthermore, if the
client possessed the expertise necessary to efficiently monitor the fiduciary's actions, the client would have had no reason to enter the relationship in the first place.'" Even so, monitoring the fiduciary does
136. Frankel, supra note 118, at 819. Frankel cites the entrustor's duty to reimburse the
fiduciary for expenses as an example of a duty the law imposes on the entrusting party, but
explains that the entrustor's duties serve to "facilitate the performance of [the fiduciary's]
services by giving him an incentive to act diligently." Id.
137. Id. at 823.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 813.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 813-14.
143. Id. at 813.

144. Id.
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not prevent abuse of power but simply serves as a policing mechanism."' The fiduciary may still hide the abusive activities, adding to
the costs of the relationship.146
The legal and practical distinctions between fiduciary and traditional contractual relationships flatly rebut any notion that they
should or can be merged. These differences require a distinction in
applying the economic loss doctrine depending on which type of relationship is present. Interstate failed to make this distinction.
One commentator has suggested that Interstate, taken to its logical extreme, would eliminate all claims of malpractice or breach of
fiduciary duty by customers of professional services, regardless of how
egregious the conduct, if the services were rendered pursuant to a
contract. 147 Part IV recognizes this threat and reveals the unsuitability of the economic loss doctrine specifically in the context of legal
malpractice claims. In legal malpractice actions, courts have traditionally acknowledged the special implications of the attorney's fiduciary obligations stemming from the extensive duties owed by
fiduciaries in general. Accordingly, courts have drawn from both tort
and contract law to protect those entrusting the fiduciary. Application of the economic loss doctrine to limit entrustors claiming purely
economic damages to contractual causes of action against fiduciaries
contravenes this policy.
IV.

FEAR OF FURTHER EXPANSION: THE INAPPROPRIATENESS
OF APPLYING THE ECONOMIC Loss DOCTRINE TO
LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS

As tort claims arising from a contractual setting, legal malpractice actions face the danger of foreclosure under Interstate. Legal
malpractice rarely results in personal injury or property damage.
Most often, the claimed damages are economic or pecuniary losses
148
allegedly caused by the attorney's breach of duty to the client.
Under Interstate, the presence of a fiduciary relationship and the corresponding duties imposed on the fiduciary provide no additional protection to the entrusting party. The sole inquiry concerns the type of
damages sought. If those damages are purely economic, Interstate
confines the injured party to a contractual cause of action. Foreclo145. Id. at 814.
146. Id.
147. Hanzman, supra note 2, at 43-44.
148. Manning, supra note 129, at 742. The damages have been described as loss of the
expected benefits from the attorney's services and any expenses incurred due to the attorney's
failure to achieve that benefit. 1 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL
MALPRACTICE § 16.1, at 890 (3d ed. 1989).
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sure of t:ort-based remedies for these injured parties is clearly inappro-

priate. Undeniably, the attorney-client relationship is, in a sense,
"contractual." It is the fiduciary duty, however, that provides the
foundation of this relationship. 14 9 At least one court has explicitly
recognized that this relationship necessitates an "extracontractual
duty. ' 'I ' o Indeed, the attorney's fiduciary obligation to an individual
can arise even in the absence of the attorney-client relationship, such
as in a consultation with a prospective client. 5 1 The contractual relationship between attorney and client in no way diminishes the attor-

ney's fiduciary duties.1 52 Thus, regardless of the contractual or tort
nature of a legal malpractice claim, the attorney's fiduciary obligation
imposes duties to which the attorney must conform.' 5 3 These fiduci-

ary obligations extend beyond the technical termination of the relationship.'1 4 Interstate suggests that courts ignore this duty and

confine injured parties to contractual causes of action simply because
the parties entered into a contract and the injured party claimed
purely economic damages.
Every American jurisdiction recognizes a cause of action for
legal malpractice. 15 5 There is little consensus, however, regarding the
149. 1 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 148, § 11.1 at 633. Both the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct recognize that an
attorney owes each client a fiduciary duty. This duty is recognized primarily through rules
restricting the attorney's ability to reveal confidential information, see MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 and cmt. (1991); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 and EC 4-1 - 4-6 and DR 4-101 (1983), or to engage in conduct that
would create a conflict of interest between the attorney and client or impair the attorney's
judgment on behalf of a client, see MODEL RULES, supra at Rule 1.7 and cmt. - 1.9 and cmt.;
MODEL CODE, supra at Canon 5 and EC 5-1 - 5-24 and DR 5-101 - 5-107.
150. 2314 Lincoln Park West Condominium Assoc. v. Mann, Gin, Ebel & Frazier, Ltd.,
555 N.E.2d 346, 353 (Il. 1990). The court indicated that the appropriate cause of action to
address a breach of duty has traditionally been in tort. One commentator has interpreted this
label of "extracontractual duty" to mean that "the court implied that an attorney's obligation
to his client is not based solely on the contract existing between them. Rather, the nature of
the lawyer's undertaking and the lawyer's 'traditional responsibilities' create a duty to render
legal services with due care." Manning, supra note 129, at 753 (citations omitted).
151. 1 MIALLEN & SMITH, supra note 148, § 11.2, at 638.
152. Jonathan M. Albano, Contorts. Patrolling the Borderland of Contract and Tort in
Legal Malpractice Actions, 22 B.C. L. REV. 545, 565 (1981).
153. The Florida Supreme Court has explicitly stated that "attorneys owe a fiduciary duty
to their clients." Florida Bar v. Padgett, 481 So. 2d 919 (Fla. 1986).
154. See, e.g., Connelly v. Special Rd. & Bridge Dist. No. 5, 126 So. 794, 799 (Fla. 1930)
(quoting Trice v. Comstock, 121 F. 620, 625 (8th Cir. 1903)):
The duty of an attorney to be true to his client, or of an agent to be faithful to his
principal, does not cease when the employment ends, and it cannot be renounced
at will by the termination of the relation. It is as sacred and inviolable after as
before the expiration of its term.
See also 1 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 148, § 11.2, at 638.
155. 1 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 148, § 1.1, at 1-2.
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meaning of the phrase "legal malpractice."' 156 Some commentators
consider claims of legal malpractice to lie in "the borderland" of contract and tort with no clear division between the two causes of
action.' 57 This confusion has caused courts difficulty in selecting the
appropriate theory to apply in legal malpractice actions. Some courts
view legal malpractice actions as arising in tort from the attorney's
breach of a duty of due care. 158 Conversely, other courts see the
action as grounded upon the contractual relationship created when
the parties agree to the representation.' 59 The imprecise contours of
this "borderland" leave legal malpractice claims a prime target for
attack by the economic loss doctrine.
Although plaintiffs commonly allege breach of fiduciary duty
against attorneys," 6 plaintiffs have shared the courts' difficulty in discerning the cause of action under which to bring their legal malpractice claims. In the majority of legal malpractice cases, "no specific
basis [of liability] is actually articulated."' 6' Although this confusion
may not impact some aspects of the lawsuit, 162 it may radically affect
others. 163 When the court determines the theory of liability based on
the plaintiff's neglect to state a theory or the court's foreclosure of
certain alternatives, the plaintiff may find her relief limited or
foreclosed. 164

Classification of the claim as tort or contract may influence such
instrumental issues as the length of the statute of limitations, the date
of accrual of the cause of action, survivability of the action, and the
156. Id., § 1.1, at 2.
157. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 87-93 (1974); William L. Prosser,
The Borderland of Tort and Contract, in SELECTED Topics ON THE LAW OF TORTS 380

(1953); Eric M. Holmes, Is There Life After Gilmore's Death of Contract?: Inductionsfrom a
Study of Commercial Good Faith in First Party InsuranceContracts, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 330
(1980).
One commentator referred to the action for legal malpractice as a "two-headed creature,
one head born of the breach of an implied contractual relationship, the other growing from a
violation of the fiduciary duty owed by an attorney to his client." Albano, supra note 152, at
546.
158. See, e.g., FDIC v. O'Melveny & Meyers, 969 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1992); RTC v. Boynar,
Norton & Blair, 796 F. Supp. 1010 (S.D. Tex. 1992); Marias v. Marano, 813 P.2d 350 (Idaho
1991); Pelham v. Griesheim, 440 N.E.2d 96 (Il. 1982).
159. See, e.g., Zanders v. Jones, 680 F. Supp. 1236 (N.D. Il. 1988), aff'd, 872 F.2d 424 (7th
Cir. 1989); McConico v. Romeo, 561 So. 2d 523 (Ala. 1990); Jones v. Wadsworth, 791 P.2d
1013 (Alaska 1990).
160. 1 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 148, § 8.1, at 401.
161. DAVID J. MEISELMAN, ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE:

(1980).
162.
of how
163.
164.

LAW AND PROCEDURE § 2.3

See, e.g., id. ("the same essential standard applies regardless of theory and regardless
the cause of action is phrased").
See infra notes 165-207 and accompanying text.
Id.
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type of damages recoverable. 165
Although Florida has adopted a single statute of limitations for
contract;- and tort-based professional malpractice actions, 166 other
jurisdictions have not. 167 In jurisdictions lacking a uniform statute,
selecting the theory under which to bring the legal malpractice claim
may be crucial because tort statutes of limitations are typically shorter
than those for contract.' 6 The different limitations periods gain
importance if the plaintiff is not permitted to choose between tort or
contract actions, but instead must await the court's decision regarding
169
which statute governs.
The issue of when the legal malpractice action accrues is intertwined with the issue of determining the appropriate statute of limitations. Contract actions typically accrue at the time of breach and
allow recovery of at least nominal damages. 7 ' The drawback, however, is that the statute of limitations may bar the cause of action
before the plaintiff becomes aware of the attorney's breach. 71' Fortunately, most jurisdictions have recognized this problem and aban172
doned use of this theory.
Accrual of a tort action, conversely, does not commence until the
165. See Prosser, supra note 157, at 421, 422 n.204; see also William L. Prosser, The Assault
upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1127-33 (1960);
William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966).
166. FLA. STAT. ch. 95.1l(4)(a) (1983) provides:
(4) WITHIN TWO YEARS.(a) An action for professional malpractice, other than medical malpractice,
whether founded on contract or tort; provided that the period of limitations shall
run from the time the cause of action is discovered or should have been
discovered with the exercise of due diligence. However, the limitation of actions
herein for professional malpractice shall be limited to persons in privity with the
profissional.
167. See generally, Joseph H. Koffier, Legal MalpracticeStatutes of Limitations: A Critical
Analysis of a Burgeoning Crisis, 20 AKRON L. REV. 209, 229-36 (1986) (analyzing various
states' approaches to determining the applicable statutes of limitations in legal malpractice
actions). Cne court has observed that in jurisdictions lacking a specific statute governing
malpractice actions "most courts permit a plaintiff to elect between the contract and tort
limitations periods depending on how the complaint is framed." Fitzgerald v. Congleton, 583
A.2d 595, 598 (Vt. 1990).
168. Albano, supra note 152, at 546.
169. Id. at 546-48 (reviewing cases using "arbitrary, unconvincing factors" to determine
whether a tort or contract statute of limitations applies); see also Fitzgerald v. Congleton, 583
A.2d 595 (Vt. 1990) (splitting legal malpractice claim and finding part of the claim time-barred
by applying: (1) three-year statute of limitations governing actions for personal injuries to
extent claim sought damages for mental anguish, emotional distress, and personal humiliation,
and (2) six-year statute of limitations to extent claim sought compensation for economic loss).
170. JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 233 (2d rev. ed., 1974).
171. See, e.g., Wilcox v. Plummer, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 172, 181 (1830).
172. 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 148, § 18.10, at 100.
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plaintiff has suffered an actual loss or damage.17 3 The result under
this rule may not differ from the "date of breach" rule, as the plaintiff
may be prohibited from seeking relief before learning of the injury.
To counter this result, courts have increasingly used a "date of discovery" rule: the action does not begin to accrue until the plaintiff
discovers or reasonably should have discovered the defendant's
74
action. 1
Most jurisdictions now use the discovery rule for accrual of tort
actions, 17 5 and several states, including Florida,' 76 have explicitly
adopted it for legal malpractice actions. 77 Courts adopting the discovery rule for professional malpractice actions typically emphasize
the special position the professional holds in relation to the client, the
client's reliance on the professional's work, and the fact that most of
t
this work is completed out of the client's view. 7
One obvious disadvantage of the discovery rule is its hypothetically indefinite extension of liability. 1 79 Such a rule is necessary, however, to maintain the integrity of the attorney-client relationship.
Granting attorneys the prodigious protection afforded by the other
rules would generate distrust by clients, who might have no remedy if
the attorney commits a long-undiscovered error. 8 0 The discovery
rule best serves justice by tolling the statute of limitations until the
client should reasonably have learned of the harm.' 8 '
The distinctions between tort and contract also dramatically
influence the survival of the legal malpractice cause of action. Under
traditional tort theory, the cause of action would not survive the
death of either party. 8 2 The action would survive, however, if characterized in contract. 8 3 Some states allow all except enumerated tort
actions to survive. 8 4 At the extreme, Florida allows all causes of
action to survive the death of a party.' 5 Thus, an action for breach of
fiduciary duty would survive in Florida and many other states as if it
173. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 144 (4th ed.,
1971).
174. Albano, supra note 152, at 548.
175. 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 148, § 18.14, at 132.

176. See FLA. STAT. ch. 95.11(4)(a) (1983).
177. Albano, supra note 152, at 558.
178. Id.
179. 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 148, § 18.14, at 136.
180. Id.
181. Albano, supra note 152, at 558.
182. Id. at 549-50; see PROSSER, supra note 173, § 126, at 899.
183. Albano, supra note 152, at 549.
184. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3701 (1991) ("All causes of action, except actions
for defamation, malicious prosecution, or upon penal statutes, shall survive ....
").
185. FLA. STAT. ch. 46.021 (1991) ("No cause of action dies with the person. All causes of
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were a contract action. Other courts, however, have employed creative interpretations of survivability statutes to preserve the8 classic
6
tort-contract distinctions and prohibit survival of the action.
The choice between contract and tort also influences the recovery
of damages. Traditional contract damages leave a majority of victims
of breached contracts undercompensated. 8 7 Recognition of this
injustice has been widespread.18 Courts usually limit recovery in
contract actions to damages in the contemplation of the parties when
the contract was made. 8 9 Conversely, tort actions allow the recovery
of consequential damages.1'9 Also, in contract actions courts usually
require that the amount of loss be established with a reasonable
degree of certainty.' 9 ' By applying foreseeability and certainty
requirements in contract actions, courts often prevent the jury from
considering whole elements of claimed losses. 92 These requirements
are designed to prevent the victim from being overcompensated by
assuring that he is not better off following the breach than he would
have been after full performance of the contract. 93 The risk of
undercornpensation is compounded by rules that specifically deny the
injured party access to damages for nonpecuniary losses. 94 For
example, plaintiffs in contract actions usually may recover for emotional distress only infrequently and in highly restricted circumstances. "'- In contrast, tort victims generally are permitted to claim
damages for pain and suffering, thus reducing the possibility that the
action survive and may be commenced, prosecuted and defended in the name of the person
prescribed by law.").
186. Albano, supra note 152, at 550.
187. John A. Sebert, Jr., Punitive and Nonpecuniary Damages in Actions Based upon
Contract: 7oward Achieving the Objective of Full Compensation, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1565,
1571-73, 1647 (1986). See also Daniel A. Farber, Reassessing the Economic Efficiency of
Compensatoy Damagesfor Breach of Contract, 66 VA. L. REV. 1443 (1980).
188. Sebert, supra note 187, at 1565-66.
189. CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES §§ 137, 138

(1935). Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854) provides the basis for this rule that, in
actions for breach of contract, damages are "such as may fairly and reasonably be considered
either arising naturally, i.e. according to the usual course of things, from such breach of
contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of
both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it." Id.
at 145. See also, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 (1979) (restating the Hadley
rule). I will refer to this as the foreseeability requirement.
190. See MCCORMICK, supra note 189, at §§ 137, 138. Consequential damages generally
include, among other things, pain and suffering, mental anguish, and injury to reputation.
191. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 189, at § 352. I
will refer to this as the certainty requirement.
192. Sebert, supra note 187, at 1567.
193. Id. tt 1647.

194. Id.a 1584-1600.
195. See generally RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS,

supra note 189, at § 353.
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victim will not receive full compensation.196 One of the most significant differences between the two actions is the rule that punitive damages generally are not recoverable in contract actions, 197 but are in
tort.'98 This difference alone has prompted the view that tort actions
are "more advantageous" than contract actions in most cases. 199
Commentators have attributed the restriction of punitive damages to tort actions to society's perception that the tortfeasor is more
morally culpable than the contract-breaker.co This view stems from
tort law's evolution from moral obligations. Contract law, on the
other hand, denies any relationship between ethics and the law. 20 '
Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote: "Every man has the right to 'break'
his contract if he so chooses-to pay damages instead of performing
his contractual obligation. The wicked contract breaker should pay
'20 2
no more than the innocent and pure at heart.
Exceptions to the general rule prohibiting recovery of punitive
damages in contract actions are recognized in Florida 20 3 and other
jurisdictions. 20' These exceptions indicate that Holmes' proposition is
no longer authoritative. Courts have consistently deemed actions
196. Sebert, supra note 187, at 1568.
197. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 189, at § 355. McCormick
explains the purpose of punitive damages, to which he also refers as "smart money," as
"visiting a punishment upon the defendant and not as a measure of any loss or detriment of the
plaintiff." MCCORMICK, supra note 189, at § 77. As part of an extensive explanation of the
concept, Black's Law Dictionary defines punitive damages as "[d]amages other than
compensatory damages which may be awarded against [a] person to punish him for outrageous
conduct." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 9, at 390.
198. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 9-

15 (5th ed. 1984).
199. Prosser, supra note 157, at 424.
200. Leslie E. John, Formulating Standards for Awards of Punitive Damages in the
Borderland of Contract and Tort, 74 CAL. L. REV. 2033 (1986).
201. Albano, supra note 152, at 565.
202. OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 236 (Howe ed., 1963).
203. See, e.g., Singleton v. Foreman, 435 F.2d 962 (5th Cir. 1970) (applying Florida law)
(allowing punitive damages where acts contributing to breach of fiduciary duty also constitute
an independent tort); Campbell v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 306 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 1974)
(allowing punitive damages for bad faith breach of insurance contract); Goldstein v. Young, 23
So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1945) (damages for breach of promise to marry are not limited by rules
governing damages in a single contract action); Comfort Makers, Inc. v. Estate of Kenton, 515
So. 2d 1384 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (punitive damages are recoverable in case involving breach of
fiduciary duties). See generally Phyllis G. Coleman, Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract:
A New Approach, 11 STETSON L. REV. 250 (1982) (exploring the ways in which Florida courts
have used, and confused, these exceptions).
204. See. e.g., Brown v. Coates, 253 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (allowing punitive damages
where breach of contract merges with a willful tort); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d
1032 (Cal. 1973) (allowing recovery of punitive damages for bad faith breach of insurance
contract); Stanard v. Bolin, 565 P.2d 94 (Wash. 1977) (holding damages for mental anguish,
lost reputation and injury to health recoverable in action for breach of promise to marry). A
comprehensive discussion of the nationwide developing exceptions may be found in Timothy J.
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alleging breach of fiduciary duty an exception,205 indicating a belief
that the breaching fiduciary is more culpable than the general contract-breaker and that breach of a fiduciary duty constitutes more
than a simple breach of contract. 206 In contrast to the freedom to act
solely for one's self interest in the world of contract, the fiduciary
must answer to a high standard of morality. 207
The above practices reveal a distinct policy of fully protecting
injured parties in legal malpractice actions. Courts have implicitly
recognized the "borderland" and ignored traditional contract-tort distinctions in favor of choosing the aspects of each theory that best

serve this policy. For example, many jurisdictions, including Florida,
have adopted the longer contract statute of limitations to give clients

more time to bring their action for legal malpractice. 20

States,

including Florida, often combine this contract statute of limitations

with a tort rule defining when the cause of action accrues. 2°9 Many
jurisdictions, including Florida, allow the cause of action to survive

the death of a party-a benefit previously available only in contract
actions. 210 Additionally, Florida and other jurisdictions have allowed
punitive damages in legal malpractice actions alleging breach of fidu-

ciary duty-a clear break from traditional contract law. 21'
Application of the economic loss doctrine to legal malpractice

actions would contravene the policy underlying these developmentsthe protection of the entrusting party. In the areas of statute of limitations,2 1 2 date of accrual,21 3 survivability of the action, 2 4 and dam-

ages, 221' 5 the Florida courts have adopted procedures beneficial to
plaintiffs. Expansion of Interstate to legal malpractice claims would
Sullivan, Punitive Damages in the Law of Contract: The Reality and the Illusion of Legal
Change, 61 MINN. L. REV. 207 (1977).
205. See, e.g., Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 637 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981); Singleton v.
Foreman, 435 F.2d 962 (5th Cir. 1970); Kubin v. Miller, 801 F. Supp. 1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1992);
Duggan v. Rooney, 749 F. Supp. 234 (D. Kan. 1990); Wagman v. Lee, 457 A.2d 401 (D.C.
1983), cert. denied; 464 U.S. 849 (1983); Silverman v. Pitterman, 574 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 3d DCA
1991); Comfort Makers, Inc. v. Estate of Kenton, 515 So. 2d 1384 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987).
206. Albano, supra note 152, at 565.
207. Cardozo, in one of his most often quoted statements, asserted that a fiduciary duty is a
"duty of the finest loyalty," and that "[n]ot honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the
most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior." Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546
(N.Y. 1928).
208. See supra notes 166-169 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 170-181 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 182-186 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 187-207 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 166-169 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 170-181 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 182-186 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 187-207 and accompanying text.
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disregard this policy decision by eliminating tort claims for purely
economic damages, and would thus effectively restrict the bulk of
legal malpractice recoveries to contract damages.
Probably the source of greatest harm to plaintiffs from the abrogation of this policy would lie in the issue of damages. Contractual
rules more strictly limit recovery than tort rules. 216 Under Interstate,
a plaintiff's inability to liquidate damages may bar recovery. In contrast, the fact-finder in tort cases frequently assigns values to uncertain damage elements, such as pain and suffering, seemingly out of
thin air. Actions for breach of fiduciary duty are likely to generate
similarly vague and indeterminate damage elements. Elimination of
the tort jury instructions deals a harsh blow to plaintiffs and lacks
justification in the face of the policy of fully protecting plaintiffs.
Additionally, although courts in Florida have recently found that
breach of a fiduciary duty can provide a basis for allowing punitive
damages in contract actions,21 7 courts may interpret the Interstate
court's abrogation of tort claims as an indication that traditional contract rules should be followed and that this exception should no
longer be allowed.
The Supreme Court of Illinois recently acknowledged the inappropriateness of applying the economic loss doctrine to legal malpractice actions,21 ' thereby creating an exception to the doctrine, which in
Illinois, like in Florida and the Eleventh Circuit, is based on the principles articulated in Seely. The court recognized that it had previously been attempting to distinguish between recovery in tort and
contract "by looking to the nature of the damage suffered rather than
to the relationship between the parties or to the act which caused the
damage" and that this "analysis began at the end of the transaction
and reasoned in reverse." 21 9 The concurring opinion pointed out that
in each expansion of the doctrine, the "court ha[d] noted the commercial or contractual nature of the parties' relationship and the appropriateness of limiting the plaintiff to a contract-based remedy. 22 °
The concurring opinion concluded that "there is simply no reasonin logic or in custom-to extend that doctrine to the field of lawyer
malpractice. The attorney-client relationship is not the sort of commercial context in which limits on the recovery of economic losses are
216. See supra notes 187-99 and accompanying text.
217. See, e.g., Silverman v. Pitterman, 574 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); Comfort
Makers, Inc. v. Estate of Kenton, 515 So. 2d 1384 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987).
218. Collins v. Reynard, 607 N.E. 2d 1185 (Ill.
1992).
219. Id. at 1186.
220. Id. at 1188 (Miller, C.J., concurring).
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either necessary or properly applied." 2 2 '
V.

CONCLUSION

Although the economic loss doctrine is appropriate in actions
involving product liability and some service contracts, the doctrine's
rationale breaks down when expanded to cover relationships involving fiduciiary duties. Westinghouse interpreted East River as emphasizing that "[a] duty of care.., is particularly unsuited to the vagaries
of individual purchasers' product expectations. 2 22 However, courts
have consistently imposed an extracontractual duty of care on fiduciaries, such as brokers and attorneys. The Interstate court denied tort
recovery to avoid "blur[ring] the distinction between contract and
tort, ' 22 3 but actions against fiduciaries have traditionally fallen in that
indistinct "borderland" between tort and contract.
Notwithstanding the fact that Interstate involved a dispute for
purely economic damages, the inherent differences between fiduciary
and arm'si-length transaction relationships, and the existing policy of
protecting those entrusting fiduciaries render the application of the
economic loss doctrine to actions between parties in a fiduciary relationship wholly unjustified. This judgment leads to the conclusion
that Interstate was wrongly decided. In situations similar to Interstate, the courts should recognize that the fiduciary has a special relationship with the client. This relationship places independent extracontractual duties on the fiduciary requiring the fiduciary to act with
loyalty and care and subordinate his interests to those of the entrustor
irrespective of the language of any contract between them. The courts
must protect the vulnerable client who has placed trust in the fiduciary. The policing mechanism of tort liability best provides this
protectiorn.
JAMES

G. DODRILL II

221. Id. at 1189 (Miller, C.J., concurring).
222. 510 So. 2d 901.
223. See Interstate See. Corp. v. Hayes Corp., 920 F.2d 769, 775-76 (11th Cir. 1991).

